Abstract. Group signature schemes with membership revocation have been intensively researched. However, signing and/or verification of some existing schemes have computational costs of O(R), where R is the number of revoked members. Existing schemes using a dynamic accumulator or a similar technique have efficient signing and verifications with O(1) complexity. However, before signing, the signer has to modify his secret key with O(N ) or O(R) complexity, where N is the group size. Therefore, for larger groups, signers suffer from enormous costs. On the other hand, an efficient scheme for middle-scale groups with about 1,000 members is previously proposed, where the signer need not modify his secret key. However this scheme also suffers from heavy signing/verification costs for larger groups. In this paper, we adapt the middle-scale scheme to the larger groups. At the sacrifice of the group manager's cost, our signing/verification has only O(1) complexity.
Introduction
Group signature schemes allow a group member to anonymously sign a message on behalf of a group, where a group manager controls the membership of members. In case of disputes, the group manager (or a designated third party) can trace the signer from a targeted signature. The main stream of group signature schemes is certificate type [1, 6, 2, 7, 13, 12, 3, 4] . In this type, the manager issues a joining member a membership certificate, and the group signature is a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of the membership certificate. This type of scheme has an advantage that the size of signatures and public keys is independent from the group size. However, the membership revocation is not easy. The simplest revocation method is that the manager reissues the certificates of all members except the revoked member. However, the other members' loads are enormous.
Some schemes [6, 2, 7, 13, 12, 3, 4] deal with the membership revocation. However, in the schemes [6, 2, 4] , signing and/or verification requires a computation with O(R) complexity, where R is the number of revoked members.
In [7] , an approach using a dynamic accumulator is proposed, which is followed by [13] with the efficiency improvement. The accumulator allows the manager to hash a large set of effective certificates into a short value. In the group signature, the signer has to prove that own certificate is accumulated into the 
Preliminaries

Assumptions and Cryptographic Tools
Our group signature schemes utilize Camenisch and Lysyanskaya's ordinary signature scheme [8] whose security is based on the strong RSA assumption. Let n = pq be an RSA modulus for safe primes p, q (i.e., p = 2p + 1, q = 2q + 1, and p, q, p , q are prime), and let QR(n) be the set of quadratic residues modulo n, that is, the cyclic subgroup of Z * n generated by an element of order p q . The strong RSA assumption on QR(n) means that finding (u ∈ QR(n), e ∈ Z >1 ) s.t. 
The signature is (s, e, A).
Commitment Scheme. A commitment scheme on QR(n) under the strong RSA assumption is proposed by Damgård and Fujisaki [10] . The following is a slightly modified version due to Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [8] .
Key generation:
The public key consists of a secure RSA modulus n of length n , h from QR(n), and g from the group generated by h. Commitment: For the public key, input x of length x , and randomness r ∈ R Z n , the commitment C is computed as C := g x h r .
Signatures of Knowledge
As main building blocks, we use signatures converted by Fiat-Shamir heuristic [11] 
.).
The proofs used in our scheme show the relations among secret representations of elements in QR(n) with unknown order. The SP K of a representation is proposed in [10] . We furthermore use the SP K of representations with equal parts [9] , SP K of a representation with parts in intervals [5, 9] , and SP K of a representation with a non-negative part [5] .
SP K of representation:
An SP K proving the knowledge of a representation of C ∈ QR(n) to the bases g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g t ∈ QR(n) on message m is denoted as
SP K of representations with equal parts: An SP K proving the knowledge of representations of C, C ∈ QR(n) to the bases g 1 , . . . , g t ∈ QR(n) on message m, where the representations include equal values as parts, is denoted as 
For this SP K, two types are known. One is due to Boudot [5] , where it is assured that the knowledge exactly lies in the interval. However, this SP K needs the computations of about 10 normal SP Ks of a representation.
Another type appears in [9] for example, where the integer the prover knows in fact lies in the narrower interval than the interval the proved knowledge lies in. However, its efficiency is comparable to that of the normal SP K.
, where˜ is a security parameter derived from the challenge size and from the security parameter controlling the statistical zero-knowledge-ness (in practice,˜ ≈ 160). In this paper, for simplicity, we describe our schemes using the former protocol [5] , since a design using the latter efficient protocol must address the expansion of the intervals. Although this expansion can be easily addressed as in [8] , it may disturb a clear grasp of the essence of our schemes. However, in the later efficiency consideration, we evaluate the efficiency of our schemes using the efficient SP K of [9] . SP K of representation with non-negative part: An SP K proving the knowledge of a representation of C ∈ QR(n) to the bases g 1 , . . . , g t ∈ QR(n) on message m, where the i-th part is not negative integer, is denoted as
As for this, since we need to prove that the knowledge is exactly 0 and over, we adopt the SP K due to Boudot [5] .
The interactive versions of these SP Ks are also used. The interactive ones are denoted by substituting P K for SP K, such as P K{α : y = g α }. The knowledge of CL signature and messages can be proved by a combined SP K [8] . Let (s, e, A) be a CL signature on messages m 1 , . . . , m L . Then, this SP K on a message m is denoted as
This SP K is computed by combining commitments and the above SP Ks, and the signer needs 5 multi-exponentiations and the verifier needs 3 multi-exponentiations. Moreover, for secret values proved by an SP K and public values, the polynomial equations and inequations among the values can be proved by a combined SP K, which is used in [12] for example. This type of SP K is simply denoted using the equation, such as SP K{(α, β, γ, δ) : αβ + γ = δ}(m). The inequation is similar.
Basic Scheme
Idea
The following intuitive discussion omits the open mechanism, which is the same as the previous scheme [12] . The proposed scheme is an extension of the previous scheme that adopts CL signatures as membership certificates. Let Sign(m 1 , m 2 ) (resp., Sign(m 1 , m 2 , m 3 )) be the CL signature on messages m 1 , m 2 (resp., m 1 , m 2 , m 3 ). Then, the previous membership certificate is Sign(x, m) issued from M M to the member, where x is the member's secret and m = 2 i−1 for member ID i (i.e, only the i-th bit of m is 1). On the other hand, M M manages a public membership informationm, where, for allĩ, theĩ-th bit ofm is 1 iff the member ı is valid (i.e., not revoked). In this setting, the group signature of member i on message M is the following SP K.
A revoked member cannot prove the above relation. For the details, refer to [12] . Note that the length of m is the group size, and thus the cost of the SP K depends on the group size, when m is larger than the security parameter n .
In the proposed scheme for larger groups, the group is divided into subgroups with less than n members. We consider that a group of at most N members is partitioned into K sub-groups with m members (N ≤ K m ). The sub-groups are indexed by ID j (1 ≤ j ≤ K). Then, each sub-group has public membership informationm j , where the i-th bit ofm j indicates that member i in the sub-group j is valid (resp., invalid) if the bit is 1 (resp., 0). The membership certificate of member i in the sub-group j is modified into Sign(x, m, j), where m = 2 i−1 . In addition, we introduce certificates ofm j for all sub-groups, sincem j should be hided in the group signature to conceal sub-group j. The certificate, called sub-group certificate, is Sign(m j , j, t), where t is a public time parameter. At every join (resp., revocation) of member i in the sub-group j, M M increases t and publishes a sub-group certificate Sign(m j , j, t) , where the i-th bit ofm j becomes 1 (resp., 0). Moreover, for the current time t, M M re-computes Sign(m,, t) for other all sub-groups and publishes them.
The group signature is as follows.
for the current time t. A revoked member i cannot prepare his sub-group certificate Sign(m j , j, t), where the i-th bit ofm j is 1. Thus, the revocation is achieved. Sincem j , j are also concealed by the SP K, the signature remains anonymous and unlinkable. On the other hand, the computation cost is small, since the lengths ofm j and m are less than n .
Proposed Protocols
Setup. Let n be a security parameter. 
The group of at most N members is partitioned into K sub-groups with m members. The sub-groups are indexed by ID j (1 ≤ j ≤ K). Then, each subgroup has public membership informationm j , where the i-th bit ofm j indicates that the i-th member in the sub-group j is valid (resp., invalid) if the bit is 1 (resp., 0). At first, M M clearsm j as 0 (i.e., no member), and also clears a time parameter t as 0. Moreover, on the public directory, in addition to t,m j , M M publishes the certificates ofm j , Sign(m j , j, t), which are computed as follows: n and publishes the public key y = g xOM .
Join. A user U joins the group as member i in sub-group j as follows.
1. U obtains a membership certificate Sign(x, m, j) on his secret and his membership information m, as follows: (a) U chooses x ∈ R M, and sends C := a 
The group signature on M is (
The verification is to check the current time t and to verify the SP K V .
Open. By decrypting the ElGamal ciphertext (T
. This can be linked to the identity of the signer via the transcript of the join protocol.
Security
We first concentrate in the unforgeability and coalition-resistance. We can prove that, even if valid members collude, any attacking group excluding M M cannot forge any new certificates, under the strong RSA assumption. This proof is the same as [12] . On the other hand, SP K V in any group signature ensures the ownership of certificates Sign(x, m, j) and Sign(m j , j, t). Thus, only a member who is issued Sign(x, m, j) can compute the group signature. Consider a revoked member i in sub-group j. Then, at time t after the revocation, there does not exist Sign(m j , j, t) form j s.t. the i-th bit ofm j is 1. As shown in [12] , the revoked member cannot provem j = m U (2m) + m + m L and 0 ≤ m L ≤ m − 1 in the SP K V , when the i-th bit ofm j is 0. We turn to attacks using invalid certificates. The attacker may use old Sign(m j , j, t) where his bit ofm j is valid. However, t rejects the old certificate. The attacker may use Sign(m,, t) for = j. However, the SP K forces the singer to prove that Sign(m j , j, t) corresponds to his membership certificate Sign(x, m, j) via j. Thus, he cannot use Sign(m,, t).
As well as [12] , the anonymity and unlinkability holds, since a group signature consists of an ElGamal ciphertext and SP K revealing only t. This means that the signature does not reveal even the information on the sub-group. The other requirements are derived from the previous scheme [12] .
Extended Scheme
Idea
The problem of the basic scheme in the previous section is that M M re-computes all sub-group certificates at every join and revocation. Here, using a tree structure of sub-group certificates, we propose an extended scheme, where M M recomputes only parts of sub-group certificates.
For simplicity, we show the case of a k-ary tree with 2 levels, for a constant k. The extension to more levels is easy. We consider that a group of at most N members is partitioned into k 2 sub-groups with m members (N ≤ k 2 m ). The sub-groups are indexed by 2 IDs j 1 , j 2 (1 ≤ j 1 , j 2 ≤ k) . Consider the following tree. Let N 0 be the root, and let N j1 be the j 1 -th child of N 0 for 1 ≤ j 1 ≤ k. Similarly, let N j1j2 be the j 2 -th child of N j1 . N j1j2 is assigned to sub-group j 1 j 2 .
Then, the sub-group membership informationm j1j2 of the sub-group j 1 j 2 indicates the validity of membership, as the basic scheme. The sub-group certificate is modified into two certificates Sign(m j1j2 , j 1 j 2 , u j1 ) and Sign(u j1 , t), where t is the same time parameter as the basic scheme (we consider t as the time of the root node.) and another parameter u j1 consists of its parent node ID j 1 and the time t j1 of N j1 . When a sub-group membership informationm j1j2 is evolved, M M evolves the times of nodes on the path from the root to N j1j2 , i.e., times t and t j1 (Other t 1 remains) . Then, M M re-computes only the certificates w.r.t. t and t j1 , namely Sign(m j12 , j 1  2 , u j1 ) for 1 ≤ 2 ≤ k and Sign(u 1 , t) for 1 ≤ 1 ≤ k. Thus, M M re-computes 2k certificates only, which is more efficient than the basic scheme.
The group signature is modified into the following.
for the current time t. In this SP K, j indicates j 1 j 2 , which is concealed together withm j1j2 and u j1 because of anonymity and unlinkability. Since the time t is connected withm j1j2 via u j1 by the certificates, a revoked member cannot conduct this SP K. The details are shown later.
Proposed Protocols
Setup. The setups of CL signature scheme, commitment scheme, and ElGamal cryptosystem are the same as the basic scheme. As mentioned ahead, assume that a group of at most N members is partitioned into k 2 sub-groups with m members, and the sub-groups are indexed by j 1 , j 2 . Then, the sub-group membership informationm j1j2 of the sub-group indicates the validity of membership, as the basic scheme. At first, M M clears allm j1j2 as 0. In addition to time parameter t, other time parameters t j1 are all initialized as 0. Define u j1 := j 1 t j1 .
Then, M M publishes certificates Sign(m j1j2 , j 1 j 2 , u j1 ) for allm j1j2 . Additionally, M M publishes certificates Sign(u j1 , t) for all j 1 .
Revoke. Member i in sub-group j 1 j 2 is revoked as follows. For sub-group j 1 j 2 , M M evolvesm j1j2 :=m j1j2 − 2 i−1 . Then, M M evolves and publishes the times, the sub-group membership informations and the certificates, as the join protocol.
Group sign and verify. Member i in a sub-group j 1 j 2 signs a message M at the public current time t, as follows. At first, in addition to t, the member fetches all t 1 
The group signature on M is (T 1 , T 2 , V ).
Open. This is the same as the basic scheme.
Security
We show only unforgeability and coalition-resistance, since others are the same as the basic scheme. The unforgeability and coalition-resistance of certificates are the same. Consider a revoked member i in sub-group j 1 j 2 . Then, at time t after the revocation, there does not exist Sign(u j1 , t) s. For large groups, we evaluate the efficiency on the signing/verification computation (including the secret key modification), M M 's join/revocation computation, and the fetched public information size. Here, we compare our schemes to scheme [7] with efficient signing/verification and scheme [12] with short public information. We omit the comparison to other schemes due to the following reasons. The efficiency of scheme [13] is similar to [7] . The scheme [4] also has similar efficiency except that the secret key modification depends on R instead of N . Other schemes [6, 2, 4] require O(R) computation of the signer and/or verifier. Thus, these are not suitable to large groups. Our protocols in the previous sections are described using the exact but inefficient SP K for intervals [5] . Since the versions using efficient SP K [9] are easily obtained in the same way as [8, 12] , we evaluate the efficiency for the efficient versions here.
At first, we discuss the signing/verification computation costs. In the basic scheme, signature generation (resp., verification) requires 5 (resp., 3) multiexponentiations in addition to 31 (resp, 18) multi-exponentiations in the previous scheme [12] , and thus 36 (resp., 21) multi-exponentiations in total. In the extended scheme, signature generation requires 41 multi-exponentiations and verification requires 24 multi-exponentiations in total. If a tree with L levels is adopted, the signature generation cost increases to 31 + 5L multiexponentiations, which has a trade-off with M M 's cost to re-compute certificates. The L factor is decided after the M M 's cost and the public information size are discussed. On the other hand, [7] requires 14 and 8 multi-exponentiations for signing and verification, respectively. However, note that [7] furthermore requires to modify member's secret key before the signature generation, which needs O(N ) multi-exponentiations in the worst case. Although [12] needs 31 and 18 multi-exponentiations only, each multi-exponentiation requires longer times than ours for large groups, sincem (and thus m, m U , m L ) becomes long. Thus, the signing and verification costs of [12] are evaluated as O(N/ n ). Our scheme does not have such a problem, since the size ofm j orm j1j2 is less than n . Therefore, only our schemes are suitable to large groups, if small L is used.
Next, we consider the cost of M M at each join or revocation. In the basic scheme, M M has to perform roughly K = N/ n multi-exponentiations. In the extended scheme, the cost is reduced to roughly 2k = 2 N/ n . In case of using a tree with L levels, the cost is roughly L(N/ n ) 1/L . For example, if N = 1, 000, 000 and n = 1, 024, the basic scheme requires about 1,000 multi-exponentiations, and the extended one requires about 60 and 30 multi-exponentiations for levels 2 and 3, respectively. Although the costs in [7, 12] are O(1) and very low, the cost of our extended scheme is also reasonable, even if L = 2, 3.
Finally, we discuss the size of the public information fetched by the signer. [7] requires that each signer fetches all the certificates. Thus, roughly n N bits are required. [12] reduces it to only N bits ofm. Our schemes requires mainlỹ m j and the certificates (time parameters are neglected). The total size of all m j is N bits. The size of a certificate is about 3 n and the number of subgroups is about N/ n (In the extended scheme, we count only certificates on the lowest level of the tree, since upper certificates are drastically less). Thus, all the certificates has roughly 3N bits, and the total size of the public information is roughly 4N bits. Although this is slightly larger than [12] , it is sufficiently smaller than [7] . In the example of N = 1, 000, 000 and n = 1, 024, the sizes of [7] , [12] , and ours are roughly 100 MBytes, 100 KBytes, and 500 KBytes, respectively. Therefore, our scheme is sufficiently reasonable. However, for huger groups with more than 10,000,000 members, all the schemes suffer from huge public information beyond Mbytes. Thus, the limit of the group size is roughly 10,000,000. On the other hand, even if N = 10, 000, 000, M M 's join/revocation cost in our extended scheme is only about 200 and 60 multi-exponentiations in case of L = 2, 3, respectively. Therefore, since the factor L can be set to the small values, we conclude that the signing/verification cost of our schemes is O(1) within the limit of N = 10, 000, 000.
